



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


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
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**1. DUTCH DENY DIFFERENCES WITH US IMPLY SUPPORT
FOR FRENCH 'NEUTRALISM'**

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The French Foreign Ministry, the Dutch believe, is apparently interpreting Netherlands-American difficulties as an indication of Dutch support for French views as outlined in Foreign Minister

Pineau's and Prime Minister Mollet's recent speeches. On the contrary, according to the secretary general of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, the Dutch view with considerable anxiety recent French policies. They fear Mollet and Pineau plan some dangerous move during their forthcoming visit to Moscow.

The Dutch have emphasized to the French ambassador at The Hague that they continue to support NATO and that differences with the United States over Indonesia do not imply approval of French neutralist or third-force efforts.

Comment

This is the first indication, though indirect, that the French may be angling for support within NATO for their recent policy statements criticizing the rigidity of Western policy toward the USSR.

Although the Dutch have expressed dissatisfaction with the United States for not supporting them in their disputes with Indonesia, the Netherlands is unlikely to alter its present foreign policy.

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2. LYSENKO RESIGNATION

Comment on:

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The resignation of T. D. Lysenko from his post as president of the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences "at his own request" is another step in the removal of Stalin's

favorites as well as a repudiation of the Lysenko theory of genetics. The best known of his theories was that changes in environmental conditions could alter hereditary characteristics of plants. This hypothesis has never been accepted by reputable geneticists and has been officially discounted in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death.

Lysenko himself has been the target of frequent Soviet criticism over the past three years but appeared to be surviving the downgrading of his theories.

Lysenko's doctrines have had a considerable influence on Soviet biological and agricultural research for more than a decade, and serious harm has been done to the generation of scientists trained according to his precepts. Soviet geneticist N. P. Dubinin recently blamed Lysenko for blocking earlier Soviet attempts to carry out a hybrid corn breeding program, and the application of his theories undoubtedly hindered the development of improved varieties of other agriculturally important plants. His removal will probably accelerate a return by Soviet scientists to research by established techniques in the fields of biology and agriculture. [REDACTED] (Prepared jointly with OSI; concurred in by ORR)

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4. USSR AGREES TO NEGOTIATE FISHERIES ISSUE WITH JAPAN

Comment on:

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Soviet ambassador Malik informed his Japanese colleague in London on 9 April that in response to the Japanese request, the USSR is willing to negotiate the salmon fishing issue

either in Moscow or Tokyo, according to a press statement made by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu.

The USSR precipitated the North Pacific fishing crisis by announcing unilateral restrictions to go into effect on 15 May. The political purpose of this economic pressure was evident in the timing of the announcement of the decree, which was made on the same day that the London talks were suspended. It is possible, therefore, that the USSR will make the settlement of the restrictions problem conditional on Japanese agreement to immediate establishment of diplomatic relations.

Japanese foreign minister Shigemitsu has said he prefers to hold the negotiations in Moscow, a choice apparently dictated by the desire to avoid according to the unrecognized Soviet mission in Tokyo any official status. Shigemitsu has asserted that the entire fishery problem will be discussed rather than just the restriction of salmon catches. Tokyo probably wishes to settle this problem, on which Japan is economically vulnerable and which the USSR could use as pressure to force concessions on issues related to negotiations on a peace treaty.

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
(Information as of 1700, 10 April)

Egyptian foreign minister Fawzi has avoided a direct reply to Israel's demands for cessation of hostile acts by noon on 10 April.

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Israel has claimed, meanwhile, that Egyptian-sponsored terrorist operations continued inside Israel during the night of 9-10 April. Ten settlements are reported to have been attacked, resulting in one Israeli killed and the sabotage of water installations and rail lines. Israel claims a total of ten terrorists killed in the last two days.

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